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Sanders Brothers Revisited:
Protection of Broadcasters from
the Consequences of
Economic Competition
By JACOB W. MAY.R*
1. Tm PROBLEM
A communications media may suffer economic injury if a new
broadcast station enters its market or if an existing station
improves or relocates its facilities and thus provides a more
competitive signal. Assuming, for convenience, that two broad-
casters operating the same type of station are involved, three of
the possible results of increased competition are that (1) both
stations will survive in the market without incurring significant
injury, (2) one competitor or the other will be driven out of the
market, allowing the survivor to serve the market without opposi-
tion, or (8) the competitors will inflict such financial injury on
each other that, regardless of whether or not either one is
eventually forced out of the market, the service provided to the
public after the economic contest will not be as good as that avail-
able before the entrance of the new competitor in the market.
The possibility of an ultimate diminution in the quality of
service provided to the public poses obvious public interest prob-
lems. These problems are compounded by the equally obvious
public interest to be served by providing additional service.
Further, nondestructive competition would presumably ensure
better programming by both stations in their efforts to attract the
listening public.'
* B.S., LL.B., Kentucky, LL.M., George Washington University, Attorney-
Adviser, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. The views ex-
pressed herein are those of the author and not of the Commission.
1 See e.g. Report of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Network Broadcasting, H.R. Rep. No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1958).
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Analysis of the indicated problem area will require discussion
of relevant features of the basic statute in the broadcast industry,
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,2 and survey of a
variety of administrative and judicial decisions.
II. THE AcT
The licensing of a broadcast station by the Federal Com-
munications Commission is accomplished in two steps.3 An ap-
plicant, whether for new facilities or for changes in an existing
station, must first apply for and receive a construction permit
which authorizes the proposed construction.4 From the time the
applicant receives the construction permit, it is protected against
the grant of new applications specifying facilities which would
cause unreasonable amounts of destructive electrical interfer-
ence.5 However, by express provision of Section 8(h) of the act,
the permittee is not a common carrier, so it does not receive
utility protection. This being so, the act does not explicitly
protect either a permittee or a licensee from the destructive eco-
nomic interference which may be caused by a new competitor
in its market.
Whenever an application is filed for a construction permit for
a broadcast station, the Commission determines whether the
applicant is legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified
to receive a construction permit." If affirmative findings are made
and no competing application is on file,' the Commission will be
able to find that a grant of the construction permit will "serve
the public interest, convenience, and necessity," the statutory
guide-line for Commission actions, and grant the application.8
248 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §§151-609(1960). The
Federal Communications Commission operates pursuant to the Communication Act
68 Stat. 30 (1954), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §501 and appeals from its decisions in
the broadcast field are normally taken only to the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit; therefore the conventional terms "Commission," act, and
"court" will be employed hereafter.
a This discussion of the Commission's licensing function and the relevant
statutory provisions is limited to a synopsis of provisions considered relevant to
"economic impact" problems.
447 U.S.C.A. §§308(a) and 819(c) (1960).
5 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
047 U.S.C.A. §§308(b) and 319(a) (1960).
7 If more than one application on file specifies the same facilities, it is
necessary to conduct a comparative hearing to determine which applicant is best
qualified. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 326 U.S.
327 (1945).
847 U.S.C.A. §309(a) (1960).
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Upon completion of construction in accordance with the terms
of the construction permit, the permittee files an application for
license to cover construction permit.' Licenses are issued for a
term of up to three years. 10 At the end of the license term, the
licensee must file an application for renewal of license.11 At this
time, another party may file a competing application.'
The statutory obligations of the Commission, in passing upon
unopposed applications for construction permits, are concerned
primarily with the individual qualifications of an applicant. The
act, however, offers two basic administrative remedies which
allow third parties to object to applications, on economic or other
grounds. In general, the broadest avenue of relief is offered by
section 405 of the act which provides, in essence, that a petition
for rehearing may be filed against "a decision, order, or require-
ment" by a party in a proceeding or by any other "person
aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected thereby." If
the action complained of was the grant without hearing of an
instrument of authorization, the Commission is required to act
upon the petition within 90 days of its filing.
A procedure for pre-grant objections is provided by section
309(d) of the act which permits a "party in interest" to file a
petition to deny before grant an application for an instrument of
authorization. If a substantial and material question of fact is
presented, or the Commission is unable to find that a grant of the
application will serve the public interest, convenience, and neces-
sity, it will be designated for an evidentiary hearing in which a
party in interest, upon a proper showing of the nature of its
interest, will be able to participate.13
Appeals may be taken from Commission decisions to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to sec-
tion 402 of the act. Though section 402 presents a number of
problems which are beyond the scope of this article, it should be
948 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §§309(A), 319(C) (1960).
10 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. §M09(A), 319(c), §07(d) (1960).
1147 U.S.C.A. §§307(b), 307(d), & 307(e) (1960).
12Hearst Radio, Inc., 6 R.R. 944 (1951). (It should be noted that there is
no permanent reporter containing all Commission decisions. Citation to "R.R."
refers to "Pike and Fischer Radio Regulation," an unoffcial reporter established
after the Second World War. The Commission publishes selected opinions in
"Federal Communications Commissions Reports," cited "F.C.C.". Slip opinions
and orders are cited "FCC" and may be obtained from the Commission's Office
of Reports and Information.)
1347 U.S.C.A. §309(e) (1960).
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noted that subsection (b) (6) grants a right of appeal to "any
other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are adversely
affected."
Although the act does not define either phrase of art, it is
clear that both a "person aggrieved or whose interests are ad-
versely affected" and a "party in interest" must be very closely
related. As it happens, the phrases appear to be synonomous.' 4
There has been little difficulty in concluding that a party
threatened with electrical interference has standing,'5 but, in the
past, there was quite some confusion as to whether economic
injury gives a third party standing to object to the grant of a
construction permit. This question was answered affirmatively in
the leading case Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station,'6 which is discussed for other features in
the next section. This case established the distinction that a
party may show private economic injury to obtain standing, even
though it must then show some other reason for the Commission
to reconsider an action. Mr. Justice Roberts justified this theory
on the ground that,
[O]ne likely to be financially injured by the issue of a
license would be the only person having a sufficient interest
to bring to the attention of the appellate court errors of law
in the action of the Commission granting the license. It is
within the power of Congress to confer such standing .... 17
III. TE ROAD TO SANDERS BROTHERS
The problems resulting from economic impact arose first
before the Federal Radio Commission, and have continued to
reappear since then.' It is unnecessary to follow minutely the
early variations in the administrative treatment of the problem, 9
but some of the early court cases preceeding Sanders Brothers
deserve attention for the fluctuating view points they represent.
The first of these cases was Woodmen of the World Life Insurance
14 E.g., Application of Kansas State College of Agriculture and Applied Sci-
ence, 8 R.R. 261 (1952).
15 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
10 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
'7 Id. at 477.
18 This body was established by the Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162, and
was the predecessor of the present Commission.
19 The interested reader may find an exhaustive discussion of this topic in
Warner, Radio and Television Law 120 (1953).
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KENTucKy LAw JouN[L4
Association v. Federal Radio Commission." Station KICK, Red
Oak, Iowa, received a grant without hearing of an application
to move to Carter Lake, Iowa, within the metropolitan district
of Omaha, Nebraska. Three Omaha stations objected on eco-
nomic grounds but the grant was affirmed after hearing as the
Commission found that:
4. It does not appear from this record that the operation
of KICK at Carter Lake would so affect the interests and
advertising revenues of any of the respondent stations as
would necessitate any curtailment of either the quality or
quantity of the service now rendered by them to the pub-
lic.
2 1
On appeal, the court had no difficulty in affirming the Commis-
sion after determining that the record contained adequate sup-
port for the quoted finding. This case is particularly interesting
in view of the apparent willingness of the Commission and the
court to examine and rule on the merits of the objection. As
will be seen, this attitude did not long continue.
WGN, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission22 featured a quick
retreat from the initial willingness to consider the basic merits.
Station WBBM, Chicago, Illinois, was granted an experimental
authorization which allowed it, among other things, to increase
its hours of operation. Another Chicago station, WGN, objected
on a number of grounds, including economic injury, but did not
allege any public injury resulting from its financial loss. The
decision of the case turned on the experimental character of the
authorization granted and on other considerations irrelevant to
the present problem; however, the court mentioned the eco-
nomic impact issue but only to dismiss it as "so vague, prob-
lematical, and conjectural, as not to furnish a present substantial
objection to the Commission's decision."23 This statement might
be ignored as unrelated dictum, especially since it is not directed
squarely within the economic impact area, as WGN had not
claimed that its injury would redound against the public.24
20 65 F. 2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2 1 Warner, op. cit. supra note 19 at 122 [quoting from F.R.C. Docket No. 1678
(1932)].
22 68 F. 2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
231d. at 433.
2 4 Warner, op. cit. supra note 19 at 123, states that an issue of public injury
was raised. The court, however, interpreted WGN's argument that it was
(footnote continued on next page)
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However, since the distinction between personal and public injury
resulting from economic impact was not conclusively established
until the Sanders Brothers decision, WGN may be taken as an
early indication of judicial unwillingness to struggle with the
elusive problems of economic impact.
The Commission soon took the lead of the court and ceased
to grant intervention as a matter of right where economic injury
was claimed. In Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co.25 the Commission's
refusal to allow intervention was attacked by an erstwhile objec-
tor which sought an injunction in district court to prevent a
hearing until it could participate as a party. Issuance of a
preliminary injunction was denied as was the Commission's mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint. The Conimission took an inter-
locutory appeal on the grounds that the plaintiff's economic
interest in the proceeding did not furnish a ground for inter-
vention and that it had an adequate remedy at law under section
402 of the act. The Commission was affirmed by a divided court
on the ground that the plaintiff could protect its interests by a
subsequent appeal pursuant to section 402. Judges Groner and
Hitz dissented on the basis that the plaintiff had a legal interest
to protect, but would be unable to protect its interest on the basis
of a record which it did not help to prepare.26
The dissenting view of Judges Groner and Hitz was adopted
in Great Western Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. Federal Com-
munications Commission27 where the court stated:
We are by no means in agreement with the contention
frequently urged upon us that evidence showing economic
injury to an existing station through the establishment of
an additional station is too vague and uncertain a subject
to furnish proper grounds of contest. On the contrary, we
think it is a necessary part of the problem submitted to the
Commission in the application for broadcast facilities. In
any case where it is shown that the effect of granting a new
license will be to defeat the ability of the holder of the old
license to carry on in the public interest, the application
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
threatened with increased danger of loss or reduction of facilities as directed to
operation of the so-called Davis Amendment, 45 Stat. 373, which established
quotas for broadcast stations. 68 F.2d 432, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1938.)
2578 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 624 (1935).
26 Id. at 732.
27 94 F. 2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
1.961.]
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should be denied unless there are overwhelming reasons of a
public nature for granting it.28
Thus, the judicial wheel came full circle as the court dismissed
the "vagueness" theory which it had first advanced in WGN.
The leading case of Federal Communications Commission v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station29 followed Great Western but in-
volved only a problem of private financial injury. The Telegraph
Herald filed an application for a construction permit for a new
station in Dubuque, Iowa, while Sanders Brothers, then licensee
of Station WKBB, East Dubuque, Iowa, sought a modification of
its license to allow it to move into Dubuque. Sanders Brothers
was permitted to intervene in the hearing on the Telegraph
Herald's application, where it argued that there was insufficient
revenue available to support both stations in the Dubuque market
and that it would be driven out of business by the new competi-
tion. Nonetheless, the Commission granted both applications
without considering Sanders Brothers' showing of economic in-
jury. Failure to consider the financial injury to Sanders Brothers
led to reversal of the Commission's action as "arbitrary and
capricious."30
Before the Supreme Court, the Commission argued that eco-
nomic injury to a competitor is not a basis for refusing a license
and, therefore, Sanders Brothers was not a party aggrieved within
the meaning of section 402(b) of the act. In response to this
argument, Mr. Justice Roberts, for the Court, produced the
dichotomy referred to before, that economic injury to a private
interest is a basis for standing but that,
Resulting economic injury to a rival is not, in and of
itself, and apart from considerations of public convenience,
interest, or necessity, an element the petitioner must weigh.3'
[Emphasis added]
This holding was amplified and justified in terms of the policy of
encouraging competition in broadcasting, as follows:
Plainly it is not the purpose of the act to protect a
licensee but to protect the public. Congress intended to
281d. at 248.
29 Note 16 supra.
30 Sanders Bros. Radio Station v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 106 F. 2d
821 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
31309 U.S. 470, 478 (1940).
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leave competition in the business of broadcasting where it
found it, to permit a licensee who was not interfering elec-
trically with other broadcasters to survive or succumb ac-
cording to his ability to make his programs attractive to the
public. 32
The holding was qualified, however, with a significant limnita-
tion similar to that of the Great Western decision, that,
This is not to say that the question of competition be-
tween a proposed station and one operating under 'an
existing license is to be entirely disregarded by the Com-
mission.... It may have a vital and important bearing upon
the ability of the applicant adequately to serve his public;
it may indicate that both stations-the existing and the
proposed-will go under, with the result that a portion of
the listening public will be left without adequate service; it
may indicate that, by a division of the field, both stations
will be compelled to render inadequate service. These mat-
ters, however, are distinct from the consideration that, if
a license be granted, competition between the licensee and
any other existing station may cause economic loss to the
latter.83
Thus, despite its holding on the question of private financial
injury as a basis for protection from new competition, the Su-
preme Court clearly recognized that in some cases the conse-
quences of economic competition in broadcasting may injure the
public rather than benefit it, and further recognized that the pub-
lic is entitled to protection from such an injury.
IV. Tim FATE OF THE SANDERs BRoTEs' DicrTm
The intervention of the Second World War, which prevented
the construction of new stations for a number of years, and the
subsequent improvement in economic conditions forestalled fur-
ther economic injury cases for a number of years. However, in
1950, the problem reappeared in Voice of Cullman.34 An existing
station brought itself within the Sanders Brothers' dictum35 by
objecting to an application for a construction permit for a new
station on the ground that the economic injury it would receive
32Id. at 475.
33 Ibid.
346 R.R. 164 (1950).
35 309 U.S. 470(1940).
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would redound against the public interest. Nonetheless, the Com-
mission dismissed the objection while stating that, "... as a matter
of policy, the possible effects of competition will be disregarded
in passing upon applications for new broadcast stations.""6 This
position was justified on the basis that,
Moreover, assuming the worst possible results arose
from the establishment of the new station, the situation
would be self-correcting, and injury to the public, if any,
would be of short duration. If either station by reason of
lack of revenue becomes unable to discharge its responsi-
bility of providing a program service in the public interest,
that station will likewise be unable to secure a renewal of
license and must leave the field clear for the other station.
If both stations should cease operations, the way would
then be open for the establishment of a new station for
which.., there would be adequate support.37
Commissioner Jones, in a concurring opinion, objected that the
effect of this rationale would be to permit "competition to drive
the service to which the public is entitled below the the low water
mark permitted.. ..""s
Montana Network (KCOK),3 9 decided soon after Cuilman, re-
stated the basis of decision in Cullman to meet Commissioner
Jones' previous objection, as follows:
We also hold that the possibilities of competition be-
tween radio stations resulting in detriment to the public by
reason of lowered quality of program service are too specu-
lative in nature as against the recognized benefits of compe-
tition and the dangers inherent in according existing sta-
tions a monopoly or quasi-monopoly position to warrant our
consideration in passing upon applications for new sta-
tions.4
0
In 1955, the Cullman approach was somewhat modified in
American Southern Broadcasters (WPWR)41 when the Commis-
sion amplified its previous statements regarding the "speculative"
nature of proof in economic impact cases and categorized it as
36 6 R.R. 164, 170 (1950).
s7Ibid.
38 Id. at 171.
39 6 R.R. 445 (1950).
401d. at 446-447.
411! R.R. 1054 (1955),
[Vol. 49,
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"a fact which is incapable of proof."4 Further, the Commission
indicated that it doubted whether any type of economic impact
should properly prevent it from issuing a license to an applicant.
43
Two years later, in 1957, a rash of economic impact cases came
before the Commission and led to a further evolution of the
Cullman doctrine. The suggestion contained in American South-
ern, that the Commission might not have jurisdiction of the prob-
lem, was adopted as holding in Southeastern Enterprises,44 where
a majority of the Commission stated that "We take this oppor-
tunity now to disclaim any power to consider the effects of legal
competition upon the public service."45 In support of its position,
the Commission assumed the consequences of a contrary rule, as
follows:
45. Assuming this Commission finds ... that there are
insufficient revenues to support two stations . . . it would
seem that we should then determine whether the existing
station or the new station should provide the only service
to the community which, in turn, would involve a further
determination of which program service would be the best
for the area and which would be operated the most
efficiently.
46. Once we have decided which of the two parties will
render the service, we must assume the responsibility of
preventing an avoidance of our determination or we in
reality will have given that person a license to do otherwise;
we must impose conditions upon him to render the service
that we found was necessary and to maintain an efficient
and effective operation to that end, which would be nothing
more than the regulation of his business-to a degree even
greater than that exercised of common carriers.
46
The final embellishment of the Culman doctrine came in
Kaiser Hawaiian Village Radio, IncY where the Commission re-
affirmed its policy statement in Southeastern Enterprises, that it
had no power to consider the effects of competition, but added
that if it had such power then the policy stated in Cullman would
be applied and it would not consider the economic injury.
42 Id. at 1056.
43 Id. at 1057.
4413 R.R. 139 (1957).
45 Id. at 147.
461d. at 151.
4715 R.R. 84a (1957).
1961]
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The first appellate test48 of this doctrine came in Carroll
Broadcasting Company v. Federal Communications Commission."
Relying on the Sanders Brothers' dictum, the court sharply
rebuffed the Commission's laissez faire policy. First, the under-
lying policy was stated:
So economic injury to an existing station, while not in
and of itself a matter of moment, becomes important when
on the facts it spells diminution or destruction of service.50
On the basis of this policy, the court continued:
We hold that, when an existing licensee offers to prove
that the economic effect of another station would be detri-
mental to the public interest, the Commission should afford
an opportunity for presentation of such proof .... "I
The impact of this holding was limited, however, by the court's
recognition that "If the protestant fails to bear the burden of
proving his point (and it is certainly a heavy burden), there may
be an end to the matter."52 The weight to be attached to this
qualification is still an open question since, as yet, the Commission
has not sustained an objection based on the Carroll Broadcasting
grounds.
Since the Carroll Broadcasting decision, there has been little
further development of the threshold doctrine of economic injury
affecting the public and thus precluding the grant of an applica-
tion." In one respect, however, the Commission seems to have
gone beyond the technical requirements of the Carroll Broad-
casting decision. In Martin Karig,5 4 an intervenor claimed that
economic injury would impair its ability to serve the public and
was granted intervention on a Carroll Broadcasting issue even
though it did not claim that the totality of service available to the
public would be diminished or impaired.
48 During the long period without an appellate test of the Cullman doctrine,
the Court by way of dictum affirmed its support of the rule stated in the Sanders
Brothers dictum. Democrat Printing Co. v. Federal Communications Comm's, 202
F. 2d 298, 302, n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
49 258 F. 2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
5o Id. at 443.
51 Ibid.
52 Id. at 444.
53 The doctrine has, however, also been applied to applications before the
Civil Aeronautics Board. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 275
F. 2d 632, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
54 19 R.,, 1084 (1960).
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V. TnE PROBLEMS YET TO Comm
Since the decided cases have been directed to the problem of
whether economic impact furnishes a sufficient basis for refusing
to grant an application, they have, by and large, failed to reach
the important practical question of the action which should fol-
low a finding that the grant of an application would adversely
affect the public interest. This problem has not faced the Com-
mission and the court has not confronted it in a communications
case.
It seems implicit in the Carroll Broadcasting doctrine that the
Commission can not grant the new application after finding that
its grant would have an adverse effect on the public interest.
The most recent treatment of the subject by the court, in Delta
Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,55 supports this view, as
follows:
[I]n many fields, including both communications and
air transportation, an operating license requires a pre-
liminary finding of public interest, convenience and neces-
sity. The public interest requires service for the public. It
therefore requires that, if there be only enough business to
support operation by one licensee, there must be only one
licensee. 56
The above quotation, however, is misleading as it applies to the
communications field. Inherent in the act is the requirement that
licensees submit periodic renewal applications, which must then
be governed by the same considerations which affect the grant
of an original application.51 Consequently, even though an appli-
cation may be denied on Carroll Broadcasting grounds, the exist-
ing station is not granted an indefinite period of de facto monop-
oly since the applicant may file a mutually exclusive application
against the existing station's renewal application.
The situation at renewal time could present a host of prob-
lems. In any market with more than one existing station seeking
renewal of license, a question would immediately arise whether
all renewal applications should be treated as mutually exclusive
with the new application. To the extent that the rationale of
55 275 F. 2d 632, (1959).
53 Id. at 637-638.
57 Radio Station WOW v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 184 F. 2d
257, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
1961]
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the Sanders Brothers' dictum and of the Carroll Broadcasting
decision is interpreted as requiring that the sum of the broadcast
services provided to the public be the best available, it would
seem that all other stations in the market would need to be
included in further proceedings since they might propose and/or
provide less satisfactory public service than either the new appli-
cant or the objecting station. In practical terms, such multiparty
hearings would be involved and expensive, for all concerned, and
would increase the problems of administering the act. Thus,
although subsequent decisions may reveal that this possibility is
mere idle speculation, it is noteworthy that Carroll Broadcasting
has opened a new problem area while closing an old one.
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